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ABSTRACT 
Exemption laws enable people who default on loans to protect certain assets from 
liquidation. Every state has its own set of exemption laws, and they vary widely. 
The 1978 federal bankruptcy law contains a set of national exemptions, which debtors 
in bankruptcy are permitted to use instead of their state's exemptions unless the state 
has formally "opted out" of the federal system. We contend that states' decisions to 
opt out shed light on their exemption levels. We find that states are more likely to 
opt out if their state exemption is lower than the federal exemption and that states 
are more likely to opt out if they also have a high bankruptcy filing rate and transfer 
little money to the poor. These latter findings suggest that studies that examine the 
impact of exemptions on, for example, the bankruptcy rate should not treat exemption 
levels as exogenous variables. 
EvERY state has laws that protect some of the assets of debtors from the 
satisfaction of claims by creditors. These property exemption laws, which 
are also called bankruptcy exemptions, have long and important political 
histories. Texas entered the union as the first state with property exemptions-
designed, it was said at the time, to draw settlers from other states-but the 
southern states responded quickly with exemptions of their own, and today 
every state has property exemptions, frequently quite generous. Like usury, 
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stay, and currency laws, exemption laws have played an important role in 
the perennial conflict between debtors and creditors. 
Exemption laws also play an important role in federal bankruptcy law, 
and it is here that they enjoy a higher profile. The treatment of state property 
exemptions in the federal bankruptcy code of 1978 resulted from a compro-
mise between the House, which sought to establish a mandatory system of 
federal exemptions, and the Senate, which sought to incorporate state ex-
emption laws as the older bankruptcy law did. The compromise law estab-
lished a set of federal exemptions and permitted debtors to choose between 
these federal exemptions and the exemptions of the state in which they reside, 
unless that state had by statute "opted out" of the federal system, in which 
case the debtors would have to use that state's exemptions. Feelings about 
exemptions were strong enough in 1978 that this compromise almost did not 
occur, and these strong feelings persist today. 1 Recent efforts to amend the 
federal bankruptcy law have foundered over, among other issues, the question 
of whether state exemptions should be capped by a federal ceiling, and more 
than 65 law professors have written to Congress to ask for greater federal 
control over bankruptcy exemptions.2 
Exemptions are important because of their role in the regulation of con-
sumer credit and the light they shed on the federal relationship between the 
states and the national government. But they are a puzzle for economists 
because, like usury laws, they restrict credit markets in the absence of a well-
defined market failure to which they would be a suitable response.3 Studies 
of the impact of exemptions on credit markets show that, while exemption 
laws may provide some insurance against income shocks, they increase the 
cost of credit, particularly for the poor.4 
Many scholars have tried to explain the effect of exemption laws on 
economic behavior, including lending practices and the bankruptcy filing 
1 For a discussion by a bankruptcy judge, see William Houston Brown, Exemption Limi-
tations: Political and Ethical Considerations, in 70th Annual Meeting of the National Conference 
of Bankruptcy Judges 7-5 (1996). Most legal scholars criticize incorporation of state exemp-
tions; see, for example, Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy: Means 
Testing as a Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's Proposals as a 
Starting Point, 6 Am. Bankr. lnst. L. Rev. 1 (1998). 
2 See Letter from Barry E. Adler et al. to Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressman F. James 
Sensenbrenner (May 22, 2002) (on file with authors) (advocating a federal cap on homestead 
exemptions in bankruptcy). 
3 One might suppose that exemption laws solve an adverse-selection problem that unravels 
the market for the sort of insurance exemptions provide. However, exemptions can be sub-
stantially circumvented by security interests. 
4 See, for example, Reint Gropp, John Karl Scholz, & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy 
and Credit Supply and Demand, 112 Q. J. Econ. 217 (1997). 
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rate.5 The latter had been rising gradually through the 1960s and 1970s, but 
after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the filing rate 
increased markedly.6 Some commentators have blamed the increase on the 
generosity of federal exemption laws, but the evidence is confticting.7 Nev-
ertheless, concerns about the default rate and the bankruptcy filing rate have 
provoked calls for reform of the Bankruptcy Code, including a provision that 
would cap exemptions so that states can no longer provide generous relief 
to the wealthiest debtors, but this could hardly be expected to affect the filing 
rate, because very few debtors who have valuable assets file for bankruptcy. 
A separate concern is that state property exemptions are not sufficiently 
generous and that they vary too much across states. Many state property 
exemption laws have archaic provisions that have not been changed since 
the nineteenth century. In Oklahoma, for example, the debtor can exempt a 
gun, 20 head of sheep, and "all provisions and forage on hand."8 Commen-
tators assume that state legislatures must not care enough about exemptions 
to update them, which would justify a federal role. Although, as we will see, 
' For a survey of this literature, see Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics 
of Consumer Finance, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 168 (2002). The literature includes Vincent P. 
Apilado et al., Personal Bankruptcies, 7 J. Legal Stud. 371 (1978); Jeremy Berkowitz & 
Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy and Small Firms' Access to Credit, 35 Rand J. Econ. 69 (2004); 
Jeremy Berkowitz & Richard Hynes, Bankruptcy Exemptions and the Market for Mortgage 
Loans, 42 J. Law & Econ. 809 (1999); F. H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Market for 
Deadbeats, 25 J. Legal Stud. 201 (1996); Amanda E. Dawsey & Lawrence Ausubel, Informal 
Bankruptcy (Working paper, Univ. Maryland 2001); Emily Y. Lin & Michelle J. White, Bank-
ruptcy and the Market for Mortgage and Home Improvement Loans, J. Urb. Econ. 138 (2001); 
Richard L. Peterson & Kyomi Aoki, Bankruptcy Filings before and after Implementation of 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 36 J. Econ. & Bus. 95 (1984); T. A. E. Sullivan & J. L. Westbrook, 
As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in America (Oxford 1989); 
Laurence A. Weiss, J. S. Bhandari, & Russel P. Robins, An Analysis of State-wide Variation 
in Bankruptcy Rates in the United States (Working Paper 96/56/AC, INSEAD 1996); Michelle 
J. White, Personal Bankruptcy under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 
Ind. L. J. I (1987). We discuss some other articles below. 
6 Currently, more than 1.5 million bankruptcy petitions are filed annually. See Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts, Record Breaking Bankruptcy Filings Reported in Calendar Year 
2002 (February 14, 2003) (http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/cy02.pdf). 
7 For a survey of this literature, see Hynes & Posner, supra note 5. It is true that the exemptions 
created under the 1978 act were higher than those of many states. However, the federal ex-
emptions were not available in the states that opted out of the federal scheme, the federal 
exemptions were actually reduced in 1984, the federal exemptions were not adjusted for inflation 
until 1994, and most states did not increase their exemptions faster than inflation after 1978. 
Yet all this time the bankruptcy filing rate increased steadily. Finally, Scott Fay, Erik Hurst, 
& Michelle J. White, The Household Bankruptcy Decision, 92 Am. Econ. Rev. 706 (2002), 
claims to find a link between exemptions and bankruptcy. However, those claims are without 
support. Although the authors find a positive correlation between the overall benefits of filing 
for bankruptcy and the decision to file for bankruptcy, when they break down the overall benefit 
into family debt and nonexempt family assets, the latter do not appear to lower the probability 
of filing for bankruptcy. Therefore, Fay, Hurst, and White do not find evidence of a connection 
between exemptions and bankruptcy. 
8 31 Okla. Stat. § l (2000). 
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these concerns are exaggerated, the debate reflects the important role of 
federalism in bankruptcy policy.9 
Despite the absence of an intuitive theory to explain the market failure 
for which exemptions would be the solution, no one has tried to explain why 
states create exemption laws in the first place or why these laws differ across 
states. 10 Understanding this relationship also has important implications for 
studies that attempt to determine the effect of exemptions on lending and 
bankruptcy. These studies often treat exemptions as exogenous variables. If 
exemptions are instead driven by the very economic outcomes that these 
studies examine, the studies may suffer endogeneity bias and be suspect. 
This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature. An initial examination 
of a data set of the exemption laws of the 50 states between 1975 and 1996 
reveals only that the best predictor of current levels of a state's exemption 
is that state's historical exemptions. To overcome this difficulty, we exploit 
the opt-out provision of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, which confronted states 
with a stark choice of whether to allow their residents to use new, federal 
exemption that were often much more generous than the exemptions in effect 
in the state at the time or whether to restrict their residents to the state's 
exemptions. By examining how states reacted, we can discover some of the 
factors that influence their exemption choice. We find that states with state 
exemptions that were below federal exemptions and with higher bankruptcy 
rates and/or lower rates of income transfers to the poor were more likely to 
opt out of federal exemptions and return to lower state exemption levels. 
Section I provides background on state and federal exemption laws. Section 
II examines why states opted out of the federal exemption law. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. History of Exemption Laws 
Laws that enable debtors to avoid paying creditors extend back to Biblical 
times. There are important precursors of American state exemption laws in 
9 For a discussion of exemption policy and federalism, see G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist 
Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 Am. Bankr. L. J. 227 (2000). 
10 These explanations need not focus on market failures. One theory is that exemptions are 
motivated by altruism. However, it is unlikely that exemptions are charity because debtors pay 
for them with higher interest rates. Other theories focus on interest groups that may benefit 
from generous exemptions: existing debtors, lawyers, tort defendants, and secured lenders. But 
there are problems with these theories. For existing debtors to benefit from exemptions, they 
would have to be retroactive, otherwise debtors would pay with higher interest rates. It is 
unclear that lawyers would benefit from exemptions: while the amount clients retain may be 
higher, the number of bankruptcies may fall. Moreover, lawyers for creditors may see business 
decline. Doctors and other individual tort defendants might benefit from high exemptions, but 
the benefits are limited given, for example, that medical malpractice insurance is mandatory 
in all states. Finally, if the secured credit industry is competitive, whatever rents are earned 
through raising the cost of unsecured credit would be transferred to debtors. 
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the English common law, some of which persist today. For example, some 
states allow married debtors to shield property held in the form of tenancy 
by the entirety (TBE) from creditors of only one spouse. But recognizable 
property exemption laws did not appear in the United States until the middle 
of the nineteenth century. The first exemption law was adopted by the (then) 
Republic of Texas in 1839 and was expanded when Texas became a state in 
1845. It is thought that the purpose of this law was to attract settlers. The 
state had advertisements targeted toward settlers, and these advertisements 
drew attention to its exemption laws. 11 Although it is difficult to establish 
causality, the population of Texas rose rapidly over the subsequent decades, 
and the state developed a reputation as a debtors' haven. Many other states 
followed suit, and by the end of the 1860s, almost every state had adopted 
a homestead exemption law. 
The first laws set a pattern that prevails today. States make a basic dis-
tinction between homestead exemptions, which protect real property, and 
exemptions that protect personal property. 12 Homestead exemptions usually 
list dollar amounts but sometimes refer to particular acreage limits that may 
vary depending on whether the land is in a town or a rural area. In the past, 
some exemptions could be waived if the owner (and sometimes his spouse) 
signed a waiver or filed with a registry, but this is now prohibited by federal 
law, except with regard to secured credit. 13 Personal property exemptions 
usually list specific kinds of property, with individual and/or aggregate dollar 
ceilings, but sometimes allow the debtor to choose the property he will 
exempt. Personal property exemptions often refer to categories of basic ne-
cessities, like food, clothes, furnishings, or tools of trade, but sometimes they 
refer to specific items, like herds of sheep or military uniforms. Exemption 
levels may vary depending on whether the debtor is the head of a household 
or is single, is a veteran or not, and is elderly or not. 
In 1898, the federal government created the first durable bankruptcy law. 
The federal law incorporated state bankruptcy exemptions. This meant that 
if an individual filed for bankruptcy under federal law, he could (1) obtain 
a discharge from all or most of his debts and (2) keep whatever assets were 
exempted under the law of the state in which he resided. The federal law 
did not replace state debt collection laws as much as supplement them. A 
debtor could choose to enter bankruptcy or not; if he did not, his creditors 
could sue him for unpaid debts but still could not liquidate his exempt assets. 
In 1978, the federal government replaced the old bankruptcy system with 
the current one. The House tried to replace state exemptions with a uniform 
11 Paul Goodman, The Emergence of Homestead Exemptions in the United States: Accom-
modation and Resistance to the Market Revolution, 1840-1880, 80 J. Am. Hist. 470 (1993). 
12 The states and the federal government also provide exemptions for insurance and for future 
income in the form of limitations on garnishment. These exemptions are beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
13 16 C.F.R. § 444.2. 
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system of federal exemptions, while the Senate sought to maintain the old 
system of federal incorporation of state exemptions. 14 The compromise was 
a set of uniform federal exemptions that a debtor could choose over his 
state's exemptions, except in those states that formally opt out of the federal 
system. In states that opt out, debtors must use local exemption laws. About 
two-thirds of the states had opted out by the early 1980s. 
B. How Exemptions Operate 
To understand how exemption laws work, imagine that a creditor lends 
$1,000 to a debtor and that the debtor defaults on the loan. Under ordinary 
contract principles, the creditor could sue the debtor for breach of contract, 
obtain a judgment, and then have a local official seize assets of the debtor, 
which would be sold, with the proceeds going to the creditor to the extent 
of its claim. Suppose that the debtor's only valuable asset is an automobile 
worth $2,000, and the relevant property exemption law says that a debtor's 
automobile is an exempt asset up to a value of $2,500. Then the local official 
would refuse to liquidate the creditor's claim by seizing the automobile. The 
creditor's claim would continue to be valid, and the creditor could enforce 
it against any nonexempt assets that the debtor might subsequently obtain. 
The creditor would in most states be able to garnish a portion of the debtor's 
wages. But the automobile would be safe. 
A debtor cannot agree to waive exemption laws in return for a lower 
interest rate: like usury laws, exemption laws supply mandatory, rather than 
default, rules. However, exemption laws can sometimes be circumvented, 
albeit imperfectly, through security interests and other arrangements. If, in 
our example, the creditor had obtained a security interest in the automobile 
when it lent the $1,000 to the debtor, default would give the creditor the 
right to seize the automobile and sell it in satisfaction of its claim. 
Exemption laws operate the same way in bankruptcy (under Chapter 7 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, the dominant form of bankruptcy for consumers) as 
they do outside of bankruptcy. If the debtor in our first example files for 
bankruptcy, then his nonexempt assets would be liquidated, with the proceeds 
divided among all of his unsecured creditors. The debtor remains roughly 
as vulnerable to secured creditors in bankruptcy as outside bankruptcy; if a 
creditor has a security interest in the car, the debtor could retain the auto-
mobile only if the creditor were repaid in full. The main difference between 
the nonbankruptcy and bankruptcy contexts is that in bankruptcy, the debtor 
can discharge the unsatisfied portion of the creditor's claim, so the creditor 
would not be able to seize nonexempt assets that the debtor subsequently 
obtains. 
14 See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 
Mich. L. Rev. 47, 94-108 (1997). 
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C. A First Look at Exemptions 
In this section, we examine the exemptions of each of the 50 states 15 for 
the years 1975-96. Because prior studies code exemption levels in different 
ways, many of them quite crude, we have started from scratch. 16 We assume 
that all debtors are married, have two children, and do not qualify for an 
increased exemption as a result of age, disability, or veteran's status. We 
further assume that all exemptions may be doubled (because the Bankruptcy 
Code and most states permit each spouse separately to claim an exemption) 
unless a statute or a specific case explicitly provides otherwise. We look at 
both homestead and personal property exemptions but exclude exemptions 
of burial funds, legal claims, fraternal benefit society annuities, insurance 
benefits, pensions, unemployment, veteran's benefits, and public assistance. 17 
Table 1 presents nominal personal property and homestead exemptions for 
all states in 1975 and 1996, the growth rate of homestead exemptions during 
this period, the states that allowed a particularly strong form of the TBE 
doctrine in 1975 (only Ohio and Massachusetts dropped it before 1996), and 
the dates that states opted out of federal exemptions. 
Consider a married couple that has $30,000 equity in their house and a 
$2,000 art collection. Assume further that they have no joint creditors. The 
couple can protect their home equity using the state's homestead exemption 
and the doctrine of TBE. The couple can retain the art collection if their 
state has a generous personal property exemption that is not restricted to, 
say, cars, furniture, and clothes. 
Table 1 shows that in 1975 the couple could have kept from creditors 
$19,000 of equity (with $11,000 to the unsecured creditors) if they lived in 
Alaska, the entire house if they live in Hawaii, the entire house if they lived 
in Indiana (although only $1,400 if they jointly owed their obligations), $0 
of equity in New Jersey, and so forth. In 1996, the couple could have kept 
the whole house in Alaska, Hawaii, and Indiana ($15,000 if the obligations 
" The District of Columbia is excluded because its exemptions are set by Congress; it does 
not have an independent legislature, unlike the states. 
16 Some empirical work on exemptions focuses on homestead exemptions alone. There are 
two problems with this approach. First, it leaves unclear how to treat states, such as Maryland 
and Virginia, with large "wildcard" exemptions that can be applied toward real or personal 
property. More seriously, this approach can give a misleading impression as to which states 
are more generous. To see this, imagine that an individual has $50,000 of home equity and 
$50,000 in personal property, and imagine that state X has a homestead exemption of $30,000 
and a personal property exemption of $20,000 and that state Y has a homestead exemption of 
$20,000 and a personal property exemption of $30,000. If one counted only homestead ex-
emptions, state X would appear more generous than state Y, but it is not clear which state our 
individual would prefer. 
17 Although important to some debtors, we exclude these exemptions from our analysis 
because of the difficulty of quantification, the illiquidity of many of them, the existence in 
many states of low dollar ceilings for them, and their usually small value compared to homestead 
and personal property exemptions. 
TABLE I 
NOMINAL HOMESTEAD AND PERSONAL PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS FOR A HOUSEHOLD 
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS 
Average PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Annual EXEMPTIONS Growth 
STATE 1975 1996 (%) 1975 1996 TBE OPT OuT 
Alabama 4,000 10,000 7 2,000 6,000 1980 
Alaska 19,000 62,100 II 5,000 6,900 1982 
Arizona 15,000 100,000 27 0 3,000 1980 
Arkansas u u 500 500 1981 
California 20,000 75,000 13 1,000 3,800 1984 
Colorado 15,000 60,000 14 1,000 2,000 1981 
Connecticut 0 150,000 0 5,000 
Delaware 0 0 0 500 10,500 Yes 1981 
Aorida u u 2,000 4,000 Yes 1979 
Georgia 1,000 10,000 43 0 2,800 1980 
Hawaii 50,000 50,000 0 2,000 2,000 Yes 
Idaho 14,000 100,000 29 1,000 3,000 1981 
Illinois 10,000 15,000 2 1,300 6,400 1981 
Indiana 1,400 15,000 46 1,200 8,000 Yes 1980 
Iowa u u 0 2,400 1981 
Kansas u u u 40,000 1980 
Kentucky 2,000 10,000 19 4,000 7,000 1980 
Louisiana 15,000 15,000 0 u u 1979 
Maine 6,000 25,000 15 2,000 5,800 1981 
Maryland 0 0 0 1,000 11,000 Yes 1981 
Massachusetts 24,000 100,000 15 1,400 1,400 Yes 
Michigan 7,000 7,000 0 0 0 Yes 
Minnesota u 200,000 4,000 6,800 
Mississippi 30,000 150,000 19 0 20,000 1987 
Missouri 2,000 8,000 14 1,300 4,150 Yes 1982 
Montana 40,000 80,000 5 0 2,400 1981 
North Carolina 2,000 20,000 43 1,000 3,000 Yes 1981 
North Dakota 80,000 160,000 5 5,000 7,400 1981 
Nebraska 8,000 20,000 7 0 0 1980 
Nevada 25,000 125,000 19 2,000 2,000 1981 
New Hampshire 5,000 60,000 52 0 10,000 1981 
New Jersey 0 0 0 2,000 2,000 
New Mexico 20,000 60,000 10 u 9,000 
New York 4,000 20,000 19 0 4,800 1982 
Ohio 0 10,000 0 2,800 Yes 1979 
Oklahoma u u 3,000 6,000 1980 
Oregon 12,000 33,000 8 1,600 4,200 1981 
Pennsylvania 0 0 0 0 300 Yes 
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0 0 Yes 
South Carolina 2,000 10,000 19 1,000 2,400 1981 
South Dakota u u 2,000 4,000 1980 
Tennessee 7,500 7,500 0 0 8,000 1980 
Texas u u 20,000 30,000 
Utah 11,000 11,000 0 0 3,000 1981 
Vermont 10,000 150,000 67 0 14,800 Yes 
Virginia 10,000 11,000 <I 0 4,000 Yes 1979 
Washington 20,000 60,000 10 0 5,000 
West Virginia 0 30,000 0 6,400 1981 
STATE 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
Mean 
Federal 
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TABLE I (Continued) 
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS 
Average PERSONAL PROPERTY Annual EXEMPTIONS Growth 
1975 1996 (%) 1975 1996 
25,000 40,000 3 4,000 4,400 
20,000 20,000 0 0 4,800 
12,788 48,595 13 1,549 6,187 
15,000' 30,000 5 3,200' 6,400 
27 
TBE OPT OUT 
Yes 1980 
NoTE.-All amounts are nominal and for a married household with two children. U indicates no dollar 
limit. Personal property values consider only wildcard and automobile exemptions. TBE = tenancy by the 
entirety. 
• Because the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 did not exist in 1975, values for the federal exemption 
are given for the year 1979 instead of 1975. 
were jointly owed) and the whole house in New Jersey because they could 
now claim the federal exemption. 
Homestead exemptions usually specify a dollar amount of home equity 
that the debtor is entitled to protect, but some states instead specify an acreage 
limit, so in principle a house of unlimited value may be exempted. Personal 
property exemptions also usually specify a dollar amount, but often they are 
divided into categories (for example, home furnishings or tools of the trade) 
with or without individual or aggregate limits. These inconsistencies create 
coding problems, which we address by testing narrower (excluding the non-
monetary exemptions) and broader (estimating the monetary value of these 
exemptions) specifications. Unless otherwise noted, we present the results 
for our broadly defined exemptions. 18 
18 The "unlimited" exemptions pose significant problems in our study for both homestead 
and personal property exemptions. Clearly the home can be quite valuable, but many items of 
relatively low value, such as wedding rings and furniture, often have no dollar limit either. 
One cannot simply ignore personal property exemptions without dollar limitations, as this 
erroneously treats them as Jess valuable than similar exemptions that do have a specific limit, 
however large. On the other hand, one cannot treat the "unlimited" wedding ring as if it were 
potentially as valuable as a mansion, both as a matter of common sense and as a result of 
judicial hostility toward aggressive exemption planning. See, for example, Norwest Bank 
Nebraska, N .A. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 878 (8th Cir. 1988); In re Krantz, 97 B.R. 514 (Bankr. 
N.D. Iowa 1989). Our approach to this problem is to replace unlimited exemptions for a given 
category of property with the average of the two highest monetary limits for that property 
among other states. Choosing the appropriate cap was difficult, as often one state exemption 
was significantly greater than the others. For example, Louisiana allows the exemption of 
wedding and engagement rings up to $5,000 (a significant sum in 1975), while the next highest 
observed limit was $1,000. We converted all exemptions into real values and then capped the 
real values of all exemptions at the average of the two highest observed exemptions from 
different states, regardless of the time period. In the case of the homestead exemption, for 
example, this was an average of North Dakota's 1979 homestead exemption ($345,833 in 1996 
dollars) and Minnesota's 1993 homestead exemption ($217,194 in 1996 dollars). We then 
converted the values back into nominal terms. As an alternative, we tried narrowing the set 
of exemptions that we considered (excluding clothes, furnishings, and so on) in order to 
minimize the number of unlimited exemptions that we needed to address. This alternative 
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Further examination of Table I reveals three other features worth noting 
about exemption levels. First, nominal exemptions rose between I975 and 
I996 (although much of this growth was eroded by inflation in most states). 
Second, the federal homestead exemption was roughly equal to the median 
state homestead exemption in 1978, and the federal personal property ex-
emption was greater than most state personal property exemptions (especially 
if one includes the ability of nonhomeowners to use the federal homestead 
exemption, discussed below). Third, there is considerable variation in nominal 
exemption levels across states: in some states, a couple can exempt virtually 
nothing, in others, tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of property. 
This last observation alerts us that subtle variations across states-in risk 
preferences, for example, or income per capita-are unlikely to explain much 
variation in exemption levels. 
Figure I provides a geographic perspective on nominal homestead ex-
emptions. The states marked with "pins" have unlimited exemptions; the 
darker states have higher nominal exemptions than the lighter states. One 
perceives a regional pattern. The unlimited states form a belt up the middle 
of the country, and Midwestern and western states have more generous home-
stead exemptions than southern and eastern states. This pattern, which holds 
up over time, does not as strongly characterize personal property exemptions. 
One of the major differences between the federal exemptions created by 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and most of the then-existing state 
exemption systems was that the entire value of the federal homestead ex-
emption could be used toward personal property of the debtor's choosing. 
Although this was changed in 1984, today a debtor may still use up to one-
half of the federal homestead exemption toward other property. While some 
states now follow the federal lead and offer "spillover" provisions that allow 
a debtor to apply some portion of the homestead exemption to personal 
property, many do not. Because these spillover provisions represent a po-
tentially valuable benefit for nonhomeowners, 19 we consider separately the 
aggregate exemptions that could be claimed by a homeowner and those by 
a nonhomeowner. 
Tables 2 and 3 define and provide summary statistics for the different 
specifications of exemptions levels utilized in this paper. It also presents other 
variables relevant to the analysis. It should be noted that we exclude the 
specification did not materially affect our results. To test the robustness of our results, we also 
use a more narrowly defined set of personal property exemptions that includes only wildcard 
and motor vehicle exemptions in order to minimize the number of unlimited exemptions. 
19 The generosity of homeowner exemptions relative to nonhomeowner exemptions continues 
to be an important issue, with the National Bankruptcy Review Commission calling for much 
greater use of "spillover" provisions than are typically found in state exemptions today. Report 
of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years (1997). 
~. 
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FIGURE 1.-Homestead exemptions for a marned couple, 1996. States w1th unlim1ted exemptwns are marked w1th "pms." 
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TABLE 2 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
Definition 
Homestead exemption ( 1996 dollars, thousands) 
Aggregate of homestead and personal property 
exemption ( 1996 dollars, thousands) 
Personal property exemption plus any spillover for 
those who do not claim the homestead exemption 
(1996 dollars, thousands) 
Individual bankruptcies (per 1,000 population) 
Banks (per I 00,000 population) 
Geographical cost of living index (by state, average is 
100) 
Divorces (per I 00,000 population) 
Doctors (per 100,000 population) 
Farm proprietors (per 100,000 population) 
Government transfers (1996 dollars per capita) 
Homestead exemption in 1920 (1920 dollars, 
thousands) 
Income (1996 dollars per capita) 
Lawyers in private practice (per 100,000 population) 
Population (per square mile) 
State statutes 
State statutes 
State statutes 
Source 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, History of the Eighties: Lessons 
for the Future ( 1997) (http://www.fdic.gov/banklhistoricaVindex.htrnl) 
Walter McMahon, Geographical Cost of Living Differences: An Update, 
19 AREUEA J. 426 (1991) 
National Center for Health Statistics 
American Medical Association, Physician Characteristics and 
Distribution in the U.S. (various years) 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Local 
Area Personal Income (http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regionaVreis) 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Local 
Area Personal Income (http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regionaVreis) 
Paul Goodman, The Emergence of Homestead Exemptions in the United 
States: Accommodation and Resistance to the Market Revolution, 
1840-1880, 80 J. Am. Hist. 470 (1993) 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Local 
Area Personal Income (http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regionaVreis) 
American Bar Foundation, Lawyer Statistical Report (various years) 
Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years) 
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TABLE 3 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES 
Variable N Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Homestead 1,100 79.36949 97.59423 0 281.5135 
Homeowner 1,100 104.5011 106.9408 0 393.1735 
Nonhomeowner 1,100 27.02727 25.06747 0 111.66 
Bankruptcy rate 1,100 1.920439 1.371076 .108726 8.980781 
Banks 1,100 7.910449 7.062247 .656168 30.42929 
Cost of living 1,100 108.4597 13.98484 88.21 164.68 
Divorce rate 1,045 5.181795 1.789499 2.030086 17.8 
Doctors 850 181.2447 49.65062 96 387 
Farmers 1,100 1,428.093 1,331.565 63.1909 6,929.702 
Government transfers 1,100 2,613.312 590.3291 1,320.204 5,263.153 
History 1,056 2.360417 1.844866 0 5 
Income 1,100 20.63301 3.64912 12.25763 33.472 
Lawyers 250 184.1749 55.28794 89.0472 409.8361 
Population density 1,100 160.9788 227.4877 .648697 1,070.939 
NOTE.-SD = standard deviation. 
doctrine of TBE from our calculation of exemptions.20 Because there is no 
clearly correct method of defining exemption levels, we considered alternative 
specifications in each of our analyses. Unless otherwise noted, they did not 
materially affect our results. 
Our initial hypothesis was that exemption levels would reflect the policy 
preferences of citizens of the various states or the influence of interest groups 
in each state. To test this hypothesis, we conducted simple state-level panel 
and cross-sectional regressions of exemption levels on proxies for various 
theories for exemptions/1 a variable for historic ( 1920) levels of real property 
exemptions in each state, and, where appropriate, year fixed effects. Our data 
spanned the years 1975-96. We tested a large number of specifications of 
variables and of empirical models. The only robust predictor of exemption 
levels during the period of our sample was historic levels of exemptions.22 
20 Because the doctrine of tenancy by the entirety can serve as a substitute for the homestead 
exemption, we tried treating those states that allow the use of this doctrine as if they had an 
unlimited homestead exemption, but we did not reach results that were qualitatively different 
from those presented below. The application of the doctrine of tenancy by the entirety is not 
uniform across states where it remains in use. We restricted our attention to those states that 
retain a fairly strong version of this doctrine. A good description of the various incarnations 
of this doctrine can be found in Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1294-95 (Haw. 1977). 
21 We proxy demand for insurance with the divorce rate and per capita income, altruism 
with government transfers per capita, existing debtors with farmers per capita, debtors' lawyers 
with lawyers per capita, tort defendants with doctors per capita, and secured creditors with 
banks per capita. In addition, we considered a cost-of-living index to test whether cost of living 
matters and population density to see if the reason why Texas adopted the first American 
exemption law-competition for migrants-still matters. We acknowledge the ambiguity of 
direction of causation for many of these variables and the probability that relevant variables 
were omitted. 
22 Tables of results are available on request from the authors. 
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One possible interpretation of this result is that exemptions are archaic: they 
mattered in the nineteenth century perhaps, but they stopped mattering by our 
period of study. However, between 1976 and 1996, there were almost 3.5 
statutory23 increases per year to the state homestead exemptions alone, and at 
least one state changed its homestead exemption in every year of our study 
except 1994. In addition, recent efforts to establish greater federal control of 
bankruptcy exemptions have provoked controversy in Congress and public 
debate.Z4 Finally, we have found some evidence of regression to the mean, 
which suggests that the explanatory variables-whatever they are-are 
converging. 25 
Most likely, exemption levels matter, but there is a great deal of inertia, 
and this makes it difficult to identify the variables that influence them. How-
ever, in 1978 the federal government forced states to overcome their inertia 
and act. This provides us with an opportunity to study the determinants of 
exemptions. 
II. FEDERALISM AND OPT OuT 
A. The 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act 
The 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act confronted many states with a stark 
choice: accept dramatically higher federal exemptions or enact legislation to 
opt out of the federal scheme. It might seem odd that the federal government 
would pass a law on a topic that the states have already considered and then 
allow each state to revert to its own judgment. However, this approach has 
been employed in other areas, such as usury law and banking regulation. 
23 States with exemptions for specific types of property (such as a ring or tools of trade) 
rather than dollar amounts of property experience annual changes in the nominal value of their 
exemptions without statutory action because such exemptions naturally keep up with inflation. 
Conversely, states without such exemptions or statutory increases in the nominal value of 
exemptions experience a decline in the real value of their exemptions. 
24 See note 2 supra and accompanying text. 
25 We regressed the growth of exemptions in each state on that state's homestead exemption 
in 1920. Although we found no evidence of regression to the mean when we use a broad 
definition of personal property exemptions to calculate homeowner and nonhomeowner ex-
emptions, we found significant evidence of regression when we use a narrow definition of 
personal property exemptions. In particular, we find that a 1 percent higher 1920 exemption 
level reduces the growth rate of exemptions by roughly 6 percent between 1975 and 1996. We 
ran separate regressions for homeowner and nonhomeowner regressions. We omitted from these 
regressions changes for states with exemption levels below those in the 1978 Bankruptcy 
Reform Act for those years in which such states had not opted out of that act. For reasons 
that we explain in Section IIA, residents of these states during those years could choose the 
more generous federal exemption over their state exemptions. Therefore, the states had no 
reason to modify their exemptions. Each regression also included variables that measure banks 
per capita, cost of living, income per capita, population density, divorce rate, and transfers per 
capita. This analysis drops two outlier states, Georgia and Delaware, which have very high 
average homeowner exemption growth rates. The finding of a regression to the mean in our 
regression analysis is robust to the exclusion of these two states. 
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The primary innovation in this paper is to use the external shock to state 
exemptions from the 1978 act to shed light on why states have different 
exemption laws. 
We assume that, prior to 1978, exemption laws in each state reflected a 
political equilibrium among interests that sought high exemptions and in-
terests that sought low exemptions. The Bankruptcy Act adopted generous 
federal exemptions, but these exemptions were optional in two senses. First, 
individuals in bankruptcy had a choice between their state exemption and 
the federal exemption. Second, states could opt out of the federal exemption, 
leaving residents with only the state exemption. Without knowing anything 
about how states arrived at their pre-1978 exemption levels, we can predict 
three things about how states would have exercised their option to opt out 
given those exemption levels. If states simply follow these predictions, we 
learn about the effect of an opt-out provision in a federal act, but we do not 
learn the motivations behind state exemption levels. To the extent that states 
take additional actions, however, we may learn something about these moti-
vations. 
Our three simple predictions are, first, that only states with homeowner 
or nonhomeowner exemptions below analogous federal exemptions will have 
opted out of the federal exemption system. The reason is that individuals in 
states with more-generous-than-federal exemptions could choose their state 
exemptions even if their states did not opt out. Second, to the extent that a 
state has decided to opt out, it will opt out immediately. A state would wait 
only if interests on one or the other side of that state's exemptions debate 
thought that time would furnish more information on the value of exemptions. 
This is a standard prediction of bargaining models. However, we are skeptical 
that groups concerned with exemptions would benefit by waiting for more 
information. There was a great deal of debate at both the state and federal 
level that preceded reform of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. Third, because 
the federal law shifts bargaining power toward supporters of more liberal 
exemptions in states with below-federal exemptions, we expect that such 
states would raise exemptions as they opt out of the federal law in order to 
"buy" the consent of these supporters. 
We expect two more informative responses by states. States with lower-
than-federal-exemption levels might not opt out if legislatures do not care 
about exemptions-if exemptions are archaic laws left on the books and not 
seen to reflect important policies. According to anecdotal evidence and prior 
studies, however, many states were concerned that high exemption levels 
would increase the cost to credit markets of existing bankruptcies and perhaps 
even increase the rate of bankruptcies. Therefore, we predict that a state with 
low exemptions was more likely to opt out if it already had a high bankruptcy 
filing rate. On the basis of literature exploring the effect of political ideology 
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on bankruptcy policy/6 we also suspected that traditionally conservative 
states were also more likely to opt out of the federal act. We assume that 
conservative states are those that were reluctant to transfer wealth to the poor 
or the unlucky and therefore predict that a state with lower-than-federal 
exemptions is more likely to opt out if it has lower levels of government 
transfers to the poor.27 
B. Empirical Tests 
1. The Decision to Opt Out 
Thirty-seven states have opted out. 28 Figure 2 presents a map of the United 
States and marks the states (shaded) that have opted out, the states (large 
dots) whose homeowner exemptions, broadly defined, exceeded the federal 
homeowner exemption at the time of the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, and the states (small dots) whose nonhomeowners exemptions, 
broadly defined, exceed the federal nonhomeowner exemption at the time of 
the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Correlations (not re-
ported) confirm the visual impression that there is a small relationship be-
tween states that opt out and states that have exemptions lower than the 
federal level;29 this remains true when states with TBE are treated as though 
they had unlimited homestead exemptions. 30 
To investigate more rigorously our hypotheses regarding the decision to 
opt out, we ran logit regressions with the dependent variable a dummy equal 
to one if the state has ever opted out and zero if not. The first independent 
variable is a dummy equal to one if the state's homeowner exemptions are 
26 See Erik Berg!Of & Howard Rosenthal, The Political Economy of American Bankruptcy: 
The Evidence from Roll Call Voting, 1800-1978 (unpublished manuscript, Princeton Univ. 
1999). 
27 An alternative definition identifies as conservative those states that strongly defend states' 
rights against federal encroachment. These states tend to be located in the South and can 
therefore be proxied by an appropriate region variable. However, there is much overlap between 
opponents of government transfers and defenders of states' rights. Indeed, our government 
transfers variable is strongly correlated with a South-region variable (or more direct proxies 
of ideology), producing near multicollinearity in regressions with both variables. Therefore, 
we report the results of an analysis with only a government transfers variable. 
28 One state, Arkansas, opted back in, in order to evade a state constitutional limit on its 
personal property exemption. See In re Holt, 894 F.2d 1005 (1990). We treat Arkansas as an 
opt-out state. Another state, New Hampshire, opted back in after our period in 1997. N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 511:2 (1996). 
29 Of the 13 states that did not opt out, six (46 percent) had below-federal (broadly defined) 
homeowner exemptions, and 11 (85 percent) had below-federal (broadly defined) nonhome-
owner exemptions. Of the 37 states that did opt out, 22 (59 percent) had below-federal (broadly 
defined) homeowner exemptions, and 35 (95 percent) had below-federal (broadly defined) 
nonhomeowner exemptions. 
30 The correlation for opt out and real federal minus state homeowner is .007, and for opt 
out and real federal minus state nonhomeowner it is .218; there is much variation in between. 
No correlation is significant at the 10 percent level. 
~. 
FIGURE 2.-Exemptions (1978) and decisiOns to opt out. Shaded states are those that have opted out, large dots designate states with homeowner 
exemptions above the federal level m 1978, and small dots designate states With nonhomeowner exemptiOns above the federal level m 1978. 
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less than the federal homeowner exemptions (so the effective exemption is 
changed by the federal law) and zero otherwise (so the effective exemption 
is unchanged by the federal law).31 One would expect that states would opt 
out only if a higher federal exemption changed the effective exemption level. 
The other independent variables are the state's bankruptcy filing rate (per 
1,000 individuals) and government transfers (real dollars per capita).32 We 
also interacted each of these with the dummy for whether a state's exemptions 
fell below the federal level. All the independent variables were drawn from 
the year 1978. The results with and without interactions are presented in the 
first and second columns, respectively, of Table 4.33 
In the absence of interactions, the best predictor of whether a state opted 
out is its bankruptcy rate. However, once interactions are added, the most 
important predictor changes to whether a state's exemption is lower than the 
federal exemption. The state continues to be more likely to opt out if it has 
a high bankruptcy filing rate, but the bankruptcy filing rate has a greater 
impact on the probability that a state will opt out if the state has low ex-
emptions as well.34 States with lower transfers are no more or less likely to 
opt out, but if these states also have exemptions that are lower than the 
federal exemptions, then they are more likely to opt out. However, this effect 
is small relative to the effect of bankruptcy filings on such states. The basic 
point is that states with generous exemptions are unaffected by the new federal 
law and so do not bother to opt out. If their exemptions are lower than the 
federal exemptions, however, then the states are more concerned about the 
effect of the federal law and more likely to opt out-and their concern 
increases with the bankruptcy filing rate and the stinginess of their transfers 
(that is, their conservativeness).35 
31 We cannot perform the analysis on nonhomeowner exemptions because all but four states 
have nonhomeowner exemptions (broadly defined) below federal levels. 
32 We separately tested a variable for conservative ideology, which was significant when 
used without the transfer variable, but the two variables are collinear, and so they both are 
insignificant when both are used. We report the transfer variable because it seems to us more 
objective and precise. 
33 We exclude nonhomeowner exemptions because there is not enough variation in the data. 
Only four states had nonhomeowner exemptions (broadly defined) that were above the federal 
level, and zero states had nonhomeowner exemptions (narrowly defined) that were above the 
federal level. Although in both cases a substantial majority of states opted out, there are not 
enough observations to confirm that a substantial majority would not have opted out if they 
had had exemptions above the federal level. 
34 This is consistent with the previous literature, which found that states with higher bank-
ruptcy filing rates in 1978 were more likely to have opted out of the federal exemptions and 
chosen a homestead exemption less than the federal homestead exemption. See Alden F. Shiers 
& Daniel P. Williamson, Nonbusiness Bankruptcies and the Law: Some Empirical Results, 21 
J. Consumer Aff. 277, 290 (1987). 
35 This analysis is subject to the warning that we are using six variables to explain the 
decision of 13 states not to opt out. 
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TABLE 4 
THE DECISION TO OPT Our 
Decision to 
Opt Out 
Decision to Decision to within 
Independent Variables Opt Out Opt Out 2 Years 
Dummy .84 9,877.65* -10.68 
(.81) (4,098.74). (6.16) 
Bankruptcy rate 4.06** 3.74* .0177 
(1.17) (1.68) (1.82) 
Dummy x bankruptcy rate 8,543.16** 6.83* 
(7.74) (3.00) 
Government transfers -.0016 .00095 -.0025 
(.0013) (.00120) (.0018) 
Dummy x government transfers -6.20** .0014 
(.0013) (.0030) 
Constant 1.43 -3.98 5.19 
(2.81) (3.05) (4.00) 
Observations 50 50 37 
Log likelihood -20.51 -11.47 -17.44 
Hypothesis tests: 
Bankruptcy rate + bankruptcy interaction 8,546.90** 6.84** 
(7.23) (2.38) 
Government transfers + government 
transfers interaction -6.20** -.0011 
(.0021) (.0024) 
Dummy + interactions (at mean value of 
covariates for states with above-federal 
exemptions) 9,655.29** 4.50** 
(10.94) (2.28) 
NoTE.-The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a state ever opted out of the federal exemptions 
scheme. The dummy for exemptions equals one if the state's homeowner exemption, broadly defined, as 
of 1978 is lower than the federal homeowner exemption, broadly defined. Coefficients reported are from 
a logit regression of the decision to opt out on the listed independent variables. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. The last three rows show point estimates for the sum of certain coefficients. They are intended 
to test the hypotheses that below-federal homeowner exemptions, bankruptcies, and transfers increased the 
probability of a state opting out. 
• The standard error was computed via a bootstrap estimate with I ,000 repetitions. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
** Significant at the I% level. 
2. The Timing of the Decision to Opt Out 
The last column of Table 1 reveals that all but two of the 37 states that 
opted out of the federal scheme did so by 1982_ This clustering of opt-outs 
immediately after the 1978 act supports our prediction that states that want 
to opt out do so immediately. 
A more interesting hypothesis is that the variables that cause states to opt 
out also influence the timing of the opt out. States that have lower exemptions, 
less generous transfer systems, and higher bankruptcy rates might opt out 
more quickly than other states. To test this hypothesis, we estimated a logit 
regression on the subsample of states that opted out of the 1978 act The 
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dependent variable takes a value of one if a state opted out within the first 
2 years of the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.36 (Fifteen of 
37 states that opted out did so by 1980.) The independent variables include 
a dummy for whether a state's homeowner exemption is below the federal 
homeowner exemption, individual bankruptcies per thousand population, and 
real per capita government transfers, all for the year 1978. We also interacted 
the dummy for lower-than-federal state exemptions with each of the other 
regressors?7 The results of the logit analysis, which are presented in the third 
column of Table 4, suggest that, conditional on having a lower-than-federal 
homeowner exemption, an increase in a state's bankruptcy rate raises the 
probability of early opt out. Moreover, having a lower-than-federal exemption 
itself is associated with a higher likelihood of early opt out. There is no 
significant effect on the probability of early opt out from having a less generous 
transfer system.38 
3. Exemption Changes When States Opt Out 
Finally, we argue that the Bankruptcy Code served in 1978 as a shock to 
each within-state political equilibrium. We predict that states with below-
federal exemptions, in order to opt out, would have to buy off supporters of 
generous exemptions by raising their exemption levels somewhat. We do not 
predict the same effect among opt-out states with above-federal exemptions. 
As an initial test, Table 5 compares the increase in exemptions in states 
that should have experienced this bargaining pressure-those that had below-
federal exemptions and cared about the issue-with the increase in states 
that did not. We compare both the percentage and absolute increase in home-
owner and nonhomeowner exemptions during the period of significant opt-
out activity, 1978-82, in Table 6. As predicted, states that experienced bar-
gaining pressure increased their exemptions by more than states that did not. 
In fact, many states that did not feel this pressure saw the real value of their 
exemptions decline owing to inflation. 
36 We do not estimate the logit on a panel data set with a variable for whether a state opted 
out in each year because an opt out is virtually always permanent. We omit state-year obser-
vations for the 13 states that never opt out of the federal scheme because we do not think that 
these states will one day opt out and that a sample of all states is simply "censored." To include 
them when estimating our hazard model would only cloud the answer to the question, when 
do states that want to opt out do so? 
37 We supplemented this analysis by estimating a Cox proportional hazard model using a 
panel data set with a variable for whether a state opted out in a given year. The independent 
variables were the same as in the logit analysis except that we added the difference between 
the federal and state homeowner exemption, real income per capita, interactions of the last 
two variables with the dummy for lower-than-federal state exemptions, and an indicator for 
whether the state legislature was in session that year. 
38 We obtain the same results with the hazard model as with the logit model. The hazard 
model also reveals that the fact that a state's legislature is in session has a statistically significant 
and the largest positive effect on the probability of opting out. This supports the earliest possible 
opt -out prediction. 
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TABLE 5 
EFFECT OF OPTING OUT ON THE LEVEL OF EXEMPTIONS (Broadly Measured), FOR STATES 
WITH STATE EXEMPTIONS LESS THAN AND GREATER THAN fEDERAL EXEMPTIONS 
Homeowner Nonhomeowner Homeowner Nonhomeowner 
(State < Federal) (State < Federal) (State > Federal) (State > Federal) 
t- 3 -.404+ -.02 -.076* 
(.231) (.319) (.033) 
t-2 -.548* -.079 -.Ill 
(.196) (.507) (.088) 
t-1 -.542** -.204 -.112 .14 
(.167) (.348) (.088) (.110) 
-.058 .283 -.019 .08 
(.099) (.204) (.068) (.114) 
t +I -.045 .214+ -.036 .056 
(.068) (.120) (.059) (.076) 
t + 2 -.024 .13* -.034 .039 
(.055) (.053) (.057) (.049) 
t + 3 .005 .051 -.045 .022 
(.034) (.046) (.055) (.032) 
N 432 630 234 36 
R2 
.93 .88 .99 .99 
F-test, t - I = t 10.99 5.8 1.87 205.93 
Prob. > F 0 .02 .2 .04 
NOTE. -Standard errors are in parentheses. 
+ Significant at the 10% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
** Significant at the I% level. 
We checked our assumption that states increased their exemptions at the 
same time that they opted out, rather than in separate statutes over time. The 
latter behavior would suggest that there was no deal making of the sort we 
envision. We found that whether a state increased its exemptions in a given 
year is correlated (not reported) with whether it opted out that year at a 1 
percent significance level for all kinds of exemptions.39 
Table 5 provides a more rigorous test of our bargaining hypothesis. There 
we report the results from a regression of log exemption levels (defined 
broadly) on state fixed effects, a state quadratic time trend, dummies for each 
of the 3 years before and after the date at which a state opts out, and a 
dummy for the year the state opts out. The state dummies control for omitted 
state-level variables. The presence of the time trends ensures that the coef-
ficients on the dummies for dates surrounding the opt-out decision measure 
deviations from state trends during those years.40 We included in our analysis 
only the 37 states that opted out. We divided these into two groups for each 
39 It is true for all years and each individual year except 1979, when only four states opted 
out. 
40 We conducted the same analysis permitting different state trends before and after the date 
of opt out. We drew the same conclusions. 
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TABLE 6 
CHANGE IN THE REAL VALUE OF EXEMPTIONS, 1978 TO 1982 
PERCENT INCREASE(%) ABSOLUTE INCREASE ($) 
Homeowner Nonhomeowner Homeowner Nonhomeowner 
Exemptions Exemptions Exemptions Exemptions 
States that opted out and had 
below-federal homeowner 
exemptions in 1978 74 150 7,854 6,475 
States that did not opt out or 
had above-federal 
homeowner exemptions in 1978 -1.2 0 -2,657 -3,467 
Difference 75* 140* 10,511.36+ 9,942** 
(30.4) (58.2) (6,154) (3,611) 
NOTE.-The table presents the change in real value of exemptions specified in each column among 
the category of states specified in each row. The dependent variables are exemptions (as indicated) 
divided into subsamples where states have exemptions that are lower than the federal level as of 1978 
and where states have exemptions that are greater than the federal level. The independent variables 
are years before and after opt out, with state and year fixed effects. All values are logged and real. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
• Significant at the 10% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
** Significant at the I% level. 
type of exemption: states with exemptions that were less generous and states 
that were more generous than the federal government as of 1978.41 We predict 
that only states with less generous exemptions would increase them when 
they opted out, for only in those states did the Bankruptcy Code act as a 
shock to the equilibrium exemption level. 
The critical statistic in Table 5 is the F-statistic for the hypothesis test that 
states increased their exemptions in the year they opted out (t) more than 
they increased their exemptions the previous year (t - 1 ). Among states that 
had exemptions below the federal level, the answer is clearly yes. Among 
states with more generous exemptions, one finds that exemptions did not rise 
as fast the year of opt out (nonhomeowner exemptions) or that the change 
in exemptions is not statistically significant (homeowner exemptions).42 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
We have not fully explained exemption laws, but we have fitted together 
a few pieces of the puzzle. Historical evidence suggests that exemptions were 
initially popular as a way to protect existing debtors against creditors and, 
thus, of attracting migrants to sparsely populated states. The best predictor 
of current levels of exemptions is historical levels of exemptions. This is not 
surprising. Existing law always supplies the starting point from which leg-
41 We also ran regressions grouping all states but interacting each independent variable with 
a dummy for whether the state had below-federal exemptions. The results were virtually 
identical to those presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
42 These results held up well for alternative specifications of exemptions. 
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islators bargain over reform, and so very old laws exert influence over the 
present and recent past. Although we do not have enough observations for 
our initial regressions to pick out the determinants of recent variation in 
exemption levels, regression of exemption levels to the mean suggests that 
these determinants are converging. 
In 1978, state legislatures were confronted with federal exemptions that 
were often more generous than state homeowner exemptions and nearly 
always greater than state nonhomeowner exemptions. States with below-
federal exemptions opted out. Although expected, this validates other evi-
dence, such as the frequency with which states modify their exemptions, that 
exemptions are still important to most states. Also as expected, states that 
ultimately opted out did so almost immediately after the passage of the 1978 
act. Finally, the 1978 act shifted bargaining power in favor of state legislators 
who preferred generous exemptions. As a consequence, legislators who pre-
ferred less generous exemptions had to agree to moderate levels in order to 
obtain the political support for opt out. 
Our main finding with respect to the question of why states care about 
exemptions is that states with high bankruptcy rates were more likely to opt 
out; the effect was larger for states with lower-than-federal homeowner ex-
emptions. The latter group also opted out more quickly. Moreover, states that 
were conservative, at least in terms of their attitude toward government 
transfers of wealth to the poor, were more likely to opt out of the more 
generous federal exemptions. But this effect was relatively small. It appears, 
therefore, that the perception that generous exemptions increase the costs of 
existing bankruptcies or raise the rate of future bankruptcies explains why 
low-exemption states care about exemptions.43 
The findings in this paper also give us some clues about the political 
history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. The battle between the House and 
the Senate over exemptions was, it turns out, really a battle over whether 
nonhomeowners ought to enjoy more generous exemptions (the original 
House bill) or be stuck with the original ungenerous state exemptions (the 
original Senate bill).44 The compromise was the opt-out system, and it really 
was a compromise in the sense that the effective exemptions for nonhome-
owners in nearly all ungenerous states rose--either because federal exemp-
tions became available to debtors or states increased their exemptions as they 
opted out. At the same time, the law permitted the states more local control 
and resulted in more variation than would have been the case if the Senate 
43 An important implication for academic analysis of the effect of exemption levels on 
bankruptcy rates is that the former ought not to be treated as exogenous variables. 
44 What did the Senate get in return for giving up incorporation of state exemptions, the 
status quo? The most likely answer is new patronage opportunities resulting from the elevation 
of bankruptcy judges. See Posner, supra note 14. 
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and House had merely agreed on uniform federal exemptions that were 
somewhat lower than those in the House bill. 
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